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Abstract: This paper exploits a unique panel dataset of households in Mopti whose baseline was 
collected in January 2012, just prior to the outset of the civil war in Mali. The follow-up survey was 
implemented in January 2017, in the midst of a rapidly intensifying armed conflict in the region. This 
paper addresses three research questions: (i) which pre-crisis characteristics of villages best explain the 
subsequent local presence of armed groups and local intensity of conflict-related violence? (ii) How the 
presence of armed groups and conflict-related violence are related to each other, and how they manifest 
themselves in the lives of communities? and (iii) what role the presence of armed groups and conflict-
related violence play in the geographic allocation of aid? Answering these questions help us shed light 
on the determinants of vulnerability to conflict, on processes of armed conflict and on the relationships 
between aid and conflict.    
 
1. Introduction 
There is now an extensive empirical literature documenting the adverse impact of armed conflicts on 
individuals’ human capital using household surveys and a micro-economic perspective. Examples of 
such papers are Akresh and De Walque (2008), Chamarbagwala and Moran (2011), Shemyakina (2011), 
Leon (2012) or Akbulut-Yuksel (2014) on education and Bundervoet, Verwimp and Akresh (2009), 
Minoiu or Shemyakina (2014) on health and nutrition. Other papers in the same mold have also looked 
at the impact of armed conflict on pro-sociality - often with counter-intuitive results (see Bauer et al. 
2016). Most of these papers focus their attention on solving the endogeneity issue arising from the non-
randomness of conflict and typically uses instrumental variables and/or difference-in-differences 
(sometimes coupled with matching). The goal is to isolate some exogenous variations in conflict 
likelihood or intensity to obtain a causal estimate of the impact of conflict. For instance, many studies 
compare children being born in conflict-affected areas with children being born at the same time but in 
less exposed areas and/or with children born in the same area but before or after the conflict. Conflict 
is typically operationalized by the number of events or fatalities at some administrative level or by direct 
exposure to killings and injuries in the household. These papers are firmly rooted in a reduced form 
2 
approach in that they do not attempt to model conflict itself. Some critical questions related to conflict 
dynamics are thus left unanswered. 
In this paper, we intend to use the same micro-level perspective to better understand the different 
characteristics of conflict, in terms of its geographical distribution, the forms it takes, and its relationship 
with aid. In so doing, we provide a conflict vulnerability analysis that contributes to our understanding 
of peoples’ lives in conflict contexts. The key contributions of the paper are based on a unique household 
panel dataset in Mopti, Mali, whose first wave was collected just before the conflict onset. This is 
especially valuable since central Mali was unaffected by previous rebellions in the country. This allows 
us to look at how pre-conflict characteristics shape subsequent conflict dynamics. The dataset contains 
rich and wide information on the conflict. Specifically, we collected information on the presence of 
armed groups, on exposure to violence, and on several potential correlates of conflict such as insecurity 
and crime, fear of traveling, service disruption, social capital and access to aid. When we combine this 
information with external data on conflict events (from ACLED and UCDP), we are able to 
comprehensively characterize the conflict in central Mali, distinguishing between the notions of 
presence of armed groups and of conflict-related violence.  
Based on this unique data, we conduct a threefold analysis. First, we investigate the determinants of the 
presence of armed groups and of conflict-related violence at village-level. To do that, we aggregate 
information from survey respondents, community leaders’ interviews and external data. We create a 
binary variable taking the value 1 if armed groups were present in the village in the study period and 0 
otherwise. We also calculate the total number of conflict events and conflict-related fatalities that took 
place within an arbitrary radius of 10 kilometers around each village in the sample, based on events 
information from ACLED. We extract information from the baseline data to document the pre-conflict 
characteristics of villages in terms of geography and service provision, social composition, agricultural 
development, and household welfare and we estimate which of these characteristics predict subsequent 
forms of conflict. 
Second, we explore the mechanisms through which the presence of armed groups and the extent of local 
conflict violence could mediate the impact of conflict on human capital. Specifically, we look at the 
correlations between presence of armed groups and conflict violence on crime and insecurity, fear of 
traveling (mobility restriction), social capital, and disruption in service provision. This analysis is not 
causal as we do not attempt to address the non-randomness of conflict. Instead, the goal of the analysis 
is to document which of the mechanisms that are often advanced in the literature to explain why 
conflicts exert such a long-lasting impact of people and communities are specifically relevant in the 
context of Mali. The analysis also examines separately the mechanisms associated with the presence of 
armed groups to those associated with the intensity of violence. 
Third, we investigate the allocation of aid during conflict. Very little is known about how the presence 
of conflict affects aid allocation. Lis, (2014) shows that multilateral and bilateral donors respond 
differently in the event of conflict in a given aid recipient country and find that conflict reduces 
multilateral aid but increases bilateral assistance. In contrast, Rodella-Boitreaud and Wagner (2011) and 
Brück & Xu, (2012) find little to no effect of conflict on aid allocations. Stoddard, (2017) find that 
insecurity influences the type of aid as it makes it more difficult to implement aid requiring technical 
complexity and high level of targeting, and that the most insecure countries have a higher allocation of 
aid going into distribution of food and shelter/non-food items and a lower proportion going into the 
health sector than in the more secure countries. This is due to health aid requiring more complex 
implementation and sustained presence. These findings are supported by cross-sectional macro-level 
analyses which point out that food aid increases in response to conflict (Kuhlgatz, Abdulai, and Barrett, 
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2010; Young and Abbott 2008). Campbell and Findley (2016) suggest that most donors increase aid 
during conflict and decrease aid when the conflict has stabilized.  
Bezerra and Braithwaite (2016) uses data on sub-national bilateral aid commitments from the AidData 
consortium and data on domestic conflicts and transnational terrorism in local areas (using standardized 
geographic grid cells) in 22 Sub-Saharan African states experiencing civil war between 1990 and 2007. 
Their results suggest that donors commit more aid to areas with recent political violence in the form of 
transnational terrorism and state conflict. Additionally, such locations continue to receive higher aid 
commitments for the 6-8 years following the conflict. On the other hand, they also find that potential 
donors are deterred from giving new assistance to areas experiencing severe levels of violence.  
Van Weezel (2017) use district level data for Uganda between 2002-2010 along with information on 
conflict and foreign aid commitments and disbursements to estimate the effect of conflict on aid 
allocation at the subnational level.  In order to circumvent the problem of reverse causality, the author 
exploits an exogenously driven shock in conflict intensity in Uganda in a differences-in differences 
framework. Results show that districts affected by sudden conflict see both lower aid commitments and 
disbursements. The analysis finds that 170 extra fatalities are associated with a 19% reduction in 
disbursements and 21% reduction in commitments. This suggests that donors are risk adverse, preferring 
to allocate aid to less risky areas. Similarly, using an IV strategy, Ghorpade (forthcoming) finds that 
conflict reduced households’ access to two large government-run cash transfer programs. 
Stoddard et al. (2017) investigate how the presence of violence affects humanitarian activities among 
conflict affected populations in Afghanistan, Somalia, South Sudan and Syria. They conclude that 
insecurity decreases humanitarian aid coverage, measured as the numbers of organizations, projects and 
personnel at the subnational level given the level of need. Finally, Maiden and Brockway (2018) analyze 
the targeting of aid during conflict using village and household level survey data from northern Mali. 
They find that agricultural aid distributed by NGOs in conflict prone areas of northern Mali is not 
necessarily reaching those most in need and that the political connections of local elected leaders matter. 
We add to this literature by estimating the village-level coverage of various forms of aid based on pre-
conflict village characteristics and on conflict, both in terms of presence of armed groups and conflict-
related violence.  
The main message of the paper is that conflict is multifaceted. Surprisingly, there is no statistical 
relationship between presence of armed groups and the intensity of local conflict-related violence. 
Moreover, village-level characteristics associated with the presence of armed groups only partly overlap 
with those associated with conflict intensity. Both dimensions of conflict are positively associated with 
ethnic diversity, with assets ownership and with agricultural development. Higher levels of household 
welfare protect villages against the presence of armed groups but not against higher conflict intensity. 
We find further that at village-level, the mechanisms through which conflict potentially affects human 
capital vary by the dimension of conflict exposure considered. Presence of armed groups is associated 
with more local crime (especially cattle theft), more mobility restriction and less trust while conflict 
intensity is associated with more service disruption and less trust. Finally, we find that the dimensions 
of conflict exert an opposite effect on aid coverage. While the presence of armed groups tends to 
strongly restrict access to aid, the coverage of aid tends to increase with local conflict-related violence. 
This suggests that aid actors proactively attempt to target conflict areas but that the entrenched presence 
of non-state actors undermines their access. Taken together, these results show that armed conflicts are 
complex and nuanced phenomena, which cannot be reduced to a single dimension when designing 
development, humanitarian and security policies. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview on the data we used 
and on the conflict dynamics in Mopti since 2012. Section 3 investigates the pre-conflict characteristics 
associated with the subsequent presence of armed groups and intensity of conflict-related violence. 
Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of the correlations between the dimensions of conflict and a range 
of local potential consequences of conflict. Section 5 presents the analysis of the role of conflict on the 
access to aid. Section 6 discusses findings and concludes. 
2. Data sources and overview of the conflict in Mopti since 2012 
 
2.1.  Data sources 
This paper draws from a unique panel dataset of households across 66 villages in Mopti.1 Two rounds 
of surveys were collected. The baseline was implemented in January 2012, three months before the coup 
and the onset of the high intensity armed conflict in northern Mali. The follow up survey was 
implemented in the same communities in January 2017. 
The baseline survey was implemented as part of an impact evaluation of a home-grown school feeding 
program across Mali (Masset and Gelli 2013), involving close to 2000 households in the Mopti region. 
The survey included wide-ranging information on agriculture and production, consumption, food 
security and socioeconomic status, children’s anthropometry, education and labor force participation 
etc. The follow-up survey was implemented in the Mopti region only, and included most of the same 
questions as for the baseline. In addition, detailed modules were added to measure exposure to conflict 
and to aid. We asked community leaders questions about the presence of armed groups in the village 
(precise timeline of events), the behaviors of these groups, and the amount of disruption of service and 
destruction of facilities. Household respondents were asked about local crime and violence, whether 
they reduced their traveling to various places because of fear, and questions related to social capital in 
the village. 
Additionally, we used external data from ACLED and UCDP/GED to map the location of conflict events 
and calculate distances between each village in the sample and the location of each conflict events. 
Based on this information, we calculated the number of events and the total number of conflict-related 
fatalities within a radius of 10 kilometers around the village. The choice of a radius is arbitrary, but we 
believe that 10km allows for a measure of violence that is local while not generating a variable that is 
too skewed (with many zeros in the distribution). Using a broader radius, such as 50 kilometers as in 
Wagner et al. (2018), would automatically weaken the relationship between village characteristics and 
the variable of violence intensity as the latter would not as “local” anymore.  
 
2.2. Brief description of Mopti 
The Mopti region is located in Central Mali. The region borders the Timbuktu region to the north, the 
Segou region to the West and Burkina-Faso to the South and South-East. It covers 79,017 km2 and was 
home to 2 million people in 2009 (last census year). The Inland Niger Delta – in the center of the region 
– is a fertile ground for farming. Mopti produces 40% of the country’s rice and 20% of its millet and 
sorghum.  The region is also the largest source of livestock in the country (ICG 2016). 
                                                          
1 4 villages could not be re-surveyed at follow-up, due to the conflict situation. 
5 
 According the 2009 census, the Dogon was the largest ethnic group, with 42% of the population. The 
Dogons are primarily farmers (ICG 2016). The Peulhs (or Fulani) constituted the second largest ethnic 
group, with 27% of the population. Although we usually associated Peulhs with cattle herding, including 
with the practice of cattle theft - not all Peulhs in Mopti are pastoralists. 
 
2.3. Timeline of the conflict 
Mali has witnessed 4 Tuareg rebellions since independence: in 1963, 1990, 2006 and 2012. Prior to the 
one in 2012, none of these rebellions reached central Mali. The latest rebellion started in January 2012 
when a Tuareg rebel group (the Mouvement de Liberation de l’Azawad, MNLA) and three jihadist 
groups (Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb, AQIM, Ansar Dine and MUJAO) attacked Malian security 
forces in northern Mali.2 Attacks by the MNLA and its allies drove the state away from northern towns 
and on 6 April 2012, the MNLA declared the independence of the Azawad (i.e. the Tuareg-dominated, 
northern regions of Mali). The succession of military defeats from the Malian army led to protests, an 
army mutiny and eventually a coup on 21 March 2012. 
The MNLA and the Islamist3 groups progressed southwards into Mopti region.4 On the 8th of January 
2013, these groups reached Kona, just 60 km north of Mopti city, the headquarter of the region. This 
eventually triggered the French military operation Serval which stopped the advance of Islamist groups 
and chased them out from Mopti (Ba and Boas 2017). During the period between January 2012 and April 
2013, the MNLA and jihadist groups largely occupied the Douentza cercle (the cercle is an 
administrative sub-division) and urban centers along the Mopti-Gao road (ICG 2016). The advance of 
rebels also caused state personnel and officials to flee the region (ICG 2016). 
The period between April 2013 – following the defeat of rebels in Mopti - and the beginning of the year 
2015 was largely free of conflict, and the Malian state attempted to re-establish its authority. From 2015 
onwards, however, Mopti was affected by a resurgence of violence. This violence has been intensifying 
every year so that the conflict crisis is now no longer seen as circumscribed to the north of Mali. On the 
contrary, the worst violence during the municipal elections of 2016 took place in Mopti and the situation 
in central Mali is currently the subject of much political, journalistic and scholarly attention (ICG 2016, 
Sangare 2016).   
We use the ACLED dataset to glean information on the intensity and actors of the conflict in Mopti. We 
restricted the analysis to the period 2012-20-17 as it corresponds to the dates of the household data 
collection. Figure 1 confirms the timeline of events just described. We can identify the 2012-2013 period, 
in which 40 conflict events took place, the year 2014, in which conflict was virtually absent, and the 
period 2015-2017 which sees increasing levels of violence. The number of violent events in 2017 were 
more than three time as much as the number of events in 2013. Fatalities have also been increasing and 
the year 2017 was even more deadly than the year 2013, although the latter witnessed large-scale military 
operations against the Islamist groups in Mopti.  
 
                                                          
2 The MNLA was founded in 2010 but only attacked in early 2012, primarily because of the return of Tuareg 
combatants from Libya (Ba and Boas 2017). 
3 With a slight abuse of language, we will use Islamist and jihadist groups interchangeably. 
4 Meanwhile, the MNLA found itself out-manoeuvred by its allies and ousted from the northern towns by the 
jihadist groups (Ba and Boas 2017). 
6 
Figure 1 Intensity of the conflict in Mopti region, 2012-2017 
 
Note: authors’ calculations based on ACLED data. 
 
2.4. Conflict dynamics in Mopti 
From a political economy perspective, the two periods of the conflict (2012-13 and 2015-17) are 
characterized by fairly different dynamics. The first period primarily involved the MNLA and Islamist 
groups on the one hand, and military forces (from Mali and France) or civilians on the other hand. 
ACLED data suggest that 28 out of the 40 events of the period 2012-14 involved interactions between 
the rebel groups, the army and the civilians. Seven of the remaining 12 events were acts of violence 
against civilians by security forces.    
The second period saw the increasing role of militias (political or identity-based). Indeed, 71 out of the 
157 violent events of the 2015-17 period involved militias whereas rebel groups were “only” involved in 
36 events. The conflict in Mopti since 2015 can no longer be summarized as primarily driven by Tuareg 
rebels and jihadist groups. Instead, the conflict became more complex as it intensified, and it is not easy 
to disentangle various forms or motives of collective violence. On the one hand, jihadist violence 
continued to exist in Mopti, notably since the establishment in 2015 of the Front de Liberation du Macina 
(FLM) by Amadou Koffa, a Mopti-based preacher who was previously in Ansar Dine. On the other 
hand, some scholars dispute the pure jihadist motive of Islamist groups and note that the boundaries 
between banditry and jihadism are blurred at best (ICG 2016).5 6  
Furthermore, Mopti has been home to other forms of collective violence, especially in relation with 
communal clashes (e.g. Dogon farmers vs Peulh herders; Peulhs herders vs Tuaregs herders) and with 
land- and resources-based conflicts (pitting farmers against herders over grazing land, or herders against 
                                                          
5 HRW (2016) quotes a Dogon farmer saying: “Honestly, Islamist, bandit, we can’t tell the difference.” (p. 6) 
whereas a Dogon leader stated that:” Yes, the jihadists are in our zone, but the situation is very complex: an 
Islamist can also be a bandit, and a bandit a jihadist” (p. 8). 
6 Sangare (2016) even disputes the importance of the FLM and claims that local banditry groups are likely 
responsible for the brunt of attacks assigned to the FLM by security forces. In any case, Sangare’s point further 
reinforce the notion of blurred boundaries between Islamist groups and banditry. 
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each other for water). The picture is made even more complex as the recruitment into Islamist groups 
appears to have been substantially drawn from ethnic Peulhs (HRW 2016, Guichaoua and Pellerin 2017, 
Sangare 2016) and because livelihood and ethnicity markers partly overlap. Hence while most Dogon 
and Bambara are farmers, not all Peulhs are herders (although a substantial minority is). ICG (2016) and 
Sangare (2016), among others, note that jihadism has often become a pretext to deal with other -local – 
grievances. 
The jihadist violence has also fueled other forms of violence. For instance, the Peulhs of Mopti have 
historically considered that the Tuaregs were favored in the peace accords of 1992. When Tuaregs 
advanced in Mopti with the MNLA, many Peulhs joined Islamist groups (especially Ansar Dine, see 
ICG 2016, Sangare 2016) as a way to protect themselves from the Tuaregs and to obtain weaponry.7 
When the state drove back the Tuareg rebels and the jihadists from Mopti in 2013, Peulhs were widely 
suspected of collaboration with these groups and severe human rights violations at the end of the police 
ensued (ICG 2016, HRW 2016). This further disenfranchised the Peulhs and pushed them to mount self-
defense militias.  
The context of a largely absent, ineffective and even corrupt state also shaped the conflict dynamics. 
For instance, as communities did not trust the state could protect them (or, as in the case of the Peulhs, 
did not trust that the state wished to protect them), community-based militias emerged and gained in 
importance. One of the most violent episodes in Mopti was the killings of 16 Peulhs herders by the 
Dozos, a Dogon militia (ICG 2016). It should also be noted that the previous Tuareg rebellions, if they 
did not directly affect Mopti, led to an increase in the availability of weapons (including AK-47) in the 
region, which fueled banditry and insecurity (HRW 2016). Some Mopti resident seemed to have 
welcome the order brought by the Islamist groups when they occupied Douentza cercle for that reason 
(HRW 2016).  
In summary, the situation in Mopti results from a complex interplay between communal relations, state-
periphery relations, state presence, rebels’ behaviors, international jihadism, economic vulnerability etc. 
This discussion emphasized four broad factors of conflict that we can measure in our dataset. First 
service provision, as militias and rebel groups directly and indirectly stem from the absence of the state. 
Second, ethnic composition of villages, as communal tensions feature heavily in the conflict landscape 
and because of the ethnic recruitment into Islamist groups. Third, agricultural development and 
importance of herding, as the clashes between herders and farmers are a prominent source of violence. 
Fourth, human development and household welfare as promoting populations welfare discourages 
young people to joining armed groups and detracts from the formation of deep-rooted grievances.  
 
2.5. Conflict in the sample of 66 villages 
Our sample in Mopti covers 4 of the 8 administrative sub-divisions (cercles): Mopti, Bandiagara, Koro 
and Douentza. The cercles of Youvarou and Tenenko (in the West), Djenne (South West) and Bankass 
(South) were not included in the baseline survey in 2012. The administrative map of Mopti region is 
displayed in Figure 2. According to ACLED, over the period 2012-2014, out of the 51 conflict-related 
events that occurred in the whole of Mopti region, 46 took place in the 4 cercles included in the sample. 
These 46 events were responsible for 219 fatalities out of the 259 fatalities that happened in the whole 
of Mopti between 2012-2014.  
                                                          
7 Of course, this does not preclude the fact that some Peulhs also joined out of ideological motives. 
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Figure 2 Administrative map of Mopti region 
 
 
Table 1 Presence of armed groups and conflict-related violence in Mopti's cercles 
Cercle Mopti Bandiagara Koro Douentza 
Panel A: Period: 2012-2014 
Number of villages where armed groups 
were reported/Number of villages in 
sample 
0/2 0/30 2/16 5/16 
Proportion of villages in cercle where 
armed groups were reported 
0% 0% 13% 31% 
Conflict-related events 29 0 3 13 
Fatalities 191 0 25 3 
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Panel B: Period 2012-2017 
Number of villages where armed groups 
were reported/Number of villages in 
sample 
1/2 0/30 4/16 5/16 
Proportion of villages in cercle where 
armed groups were reported between 
2012 and 2014 
50% 0% 25% 31% 
 
Conflict-related events 44 7 25 84 
Fatalities 231 12 130 159 
Note: Information on presence of armed groups comes from the household survey collected in 2017. Information 
on conflict-related violence comes from ACLED dataset. 
 
We use information from community leaders’ interview to ascertain which villages were affected by the 
presence of armed groups. Ten villages out of 66 were affected at any point over the 2012-17 period. 
Three villages reported the presence of the MUJAO, three villages reported the presence of Ansar Dine, 
one village reported the presence of the MNLA, one village reported the presence of AQIM and five 
villages reported the presence of unnamed bandit groups. These results show that villages were often in 
contact with multiple armed groups over the study period. Armed groups did not seem to have 
established sophisticated local governance and no village leaders reported that groups engaged in local 
service provision. However, village leaders reported that these groups often wished to enforce the 
Islamic law.  
Information displayed in Table 1 shows that 7 out of 64 villages in the sample were occupied by an 
armed group between 2012 and 2014. Douentza circle was the most affected with 5 villages where armed 
groups were present, representing almost 1 in 3 villages in this subdivision. In Koro circle, 2 villages 
out of 16 were occupied, whereas no villages in Mopti and Bandiagara villages were directly affected 
by armed groups. 
Table 1 also shows that there is not a close correspondence between the proportion of villages directly 
affected by armed groups in each cercle and the intensity of the conflict – as measured by number of 
conflict-related events and fatalities. Although Bandiagara which was spared by armed groups did not 
witness conflict-related violence between 2012 and 2014, Douentza, which was severely affected by the 
presence of armed groups, only witnessed low intensity violence (13 events for 3 fatalities overall) and 
Mopti, which was not affected by presence of armed groups, witnessed large-scale violence over 2012-
2014 (29 events for 191 fatalities overall).  
The lack of correspondence between presence of armed groups and intensity of violence can partly be 
explained by the dynamics of the conflict. Indeed, it is in Mopti cercle (locality of Kona) that the largest 
battle between the French and Malian military forces, and Ansar Dinne took place on 12 January 2013. 
This battle was responsible for 111 fatalities alone. It is also in Mopti cercle that the most important 
events of violence against civilians occurred in January 2013, causing 46 fatalities in the locality of 
10 
Sevare. In contrast, Douentza circle (and to a lower extent, Koro circle) were occupied by armed groups 
but were not home of large-scale military operations over the 2012-2014 period.  
The lack of correspondence is even more visible in Figure 3 which overlays the location of villages on 
the heatmap of violence intensity. Black triangles denote villages in which armed groups were present 
and we can see that they appear at various levels of conflict intensity on the map.  
 
Figure 3 Location of armed groups and heatmap of conflict intensity 
 
Note: each triangle represents a sampled village.  
Table 1 also highlights that the dynamics of conflict-related violence and presence of armed groups 
markedly changed over the 2012-2014 and 2015-2017 sub-periods. On the one hand, the presence of 
armed groups was a persistent phenomenon as nearly all villages which suffered from the presence of 
armed groups in the initial period continued to be affected in the 2015-17 subperiod. One village in 
Mopti, and two villages in Koro became exposed to armed groups over the 2015-17 period whereas 6 
out of the 7 villages that were directly affected in 2012-2014 were still affected over 2015-17. Overall, 10 
villages ever experienced the presence of an armed group between 2012-2014 and 9 of these villages 
were still affected in 2017. 
Conflict-related violence, in contrast, markedly changed across the two periods. Violence surged in 
Douentza and Koro circles in 2015-2017 where 71 and 22 events took place, against 13 and 3 over 2012-
2014, respectively. In Mopti, violence continued but on a lower scale than in the initial period (15 events 
for 40 fatalities over 2015-17 against 29 events for 191 fatalities in the initial period). Finally, Bandiagara 
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remained the least affected circle although 7 conflict-related events took place after 2015, for 12 
fatalities. 
Overall, we can see that one cercle was largely unaffected by the presence of armed groups and conflict-
related violence (Bandiagara). Douentza and Koro were both heavily affected by presence of armed 
groups throughout the period and by large-scale violence since 2015. And Mopti was heavily affected 
by conflict-related violence before 2014 even though violence continued after 2015.   
3. Determinants of the armed conflict in Mopti 
 
In this section, we investigate which pre-conflict characteristics of village are associated with 
subsequent conflict. We start by looking at the presence of armed groups before looking at conflict 
intensity. 
3.1. What explains the presence of armed groups in villages between 
2012-2017? 
 
Our dataset allows us to explore four broad set of characteristics to explain the presence of armed 
groups: service provision, agricultural development, household welfare, and ethnic composition of 
villages. All these variables are measured before the onset of the armed conflict in January 2012. 
Service provision includes variables on the presence of primary and secondary schools and of markets 
within close proximity of the village, and the extent of service provision at baseline (as retrieved from 
interviews with community leaders). Agricultural development is measured by the average land size, 
sales and livestock ownership (measured as tropical livestock units, TLU). Household welfare is proxied 
by average levels of food consumption (in kg per adult equivalent), dietary diversity score, and asset 
ownership. Finally, the ethnic composition of villages is characterized by the ethnic fractionalization 
index and the proportion of Peulhs in the village.8  
These four set of factors covers the most prominent explanation for the presence of armed groups 
summarized in section 2.4, i.e. absence of the state, the communal dynamics, the importance of livestock 
and agriculture, and human development.9  
We estimate the likelihood that any armed group was present in village j in period t+1 (i.e. 2012-2017) 
based on village characteristics in period t (i.e. in January 2012) through the following logistic model:   
 𝑃𝑃�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1 = 1� = Λ[𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡] 
 
(1) 
Where Λ(. ) is the logistic function, 𝑃𝑃�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1 = 1� is the likelihood that village j has experienced the 
presence of an armed group between 2012 and 2017, 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 is a vector of service provision variables, 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 
is a vector of agricultural variables, 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 is a vector of village-level variables summarizing household 
welfare and 𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 is a vector of variables describing the ethnic composition of villages. 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 is the error 
term. All right-hand side variables are measured in period t, before the appearance of armed groups in 
                                                          
8 We also calculated an ethnic polarization index which yielded similar results. 
9 We have also considered inequality within villages (measured by Gini coefficients of agriculture and welfare 
variables) but these variables proved to be mostly unrelated to conflict. 
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the Mopti region. The parameters of interest are 𝛽𝛽1,𝛽𝛽2, 𝛽𝛽3  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝛽𝛽4  which inform us on which pre-
conflict characteristics of villages are predictive of the subsequent presence of armed groups.10  
Table 2 shows the results of logistic regressions of the presence of armed groups in villages between 
2012 and 2017 on the pre-conflict characteristics of villages. Model (1) only includes service provision 
variables and no variables are significantly related to presence of armed groups. Model (2) considers 
variables describing the ethnic composition of villages. Neither the effects of ethnic fractionalization 
index nor the proportion of Peulhs are statistically significantly different from 0 at conventional levels.  
Model (3) investigates the role of agricultural development. We find that armed groups are more likely 
to target villages with higher levels of livestock ownership. An increase in 1 standard deviation in mean 
livestock ownership (corresponding to 2.8 TLU) is associated with more than double the risk of armed 
groups being present in the village. Villages with higher agricultural production are also more likely to 
experience armed groups. A one standard deviation in value of agricultural production is associated with 
more than double (2.2) the risk of presence of armed groups.  
Model (4) looks at the effect of household welfare. Mean levels of food consumption and dietary 
diversity scores are negatively associated with presence of armed groups but the effect of these variables 
fails to reach conventual statistical significance levels. In contrast, the mean level of asset ownership is 
positively associated with presence of armed groups, but here again the coefficient is not statistically 
different from 0.  
Model (5) include all variables together. The mean level of TLU at village-level is positively associated 
with the presence of armed groups, and the effect is statistically significant at 5%. Similarly, villages 
with higher levels of asset ownership tend to be more likely to experience presence of armed groups. 
The effect is not very precisely estimated (it is significant at 10%) but it is very large in magnitude. A 1 
standard deviation increase in the asset index is associated with a 7-fold increase in the risk of 
experiencing the presence of armed groups. Finally, mean levels of dietary diversity are negatively 
associated with armed groups presence (p<0.1). A 1 standard deviation increase in the dietary diversity 
score is associated with a reduction by three-quarter of the odds of armed groups presence. 
Finally, model (6) uses a backward stepwise algorithm to select the independent variables (the criterion 
for variables to be retained in the model is that the p-value associated with the variable is lower than 
0.2). We use a stepwise procedure as model (5) shows signs of overfitting, with some coefficients being 
very large. Model (6) yields similar results to model 5 except that the proportion of Peulhs and the mean 
level of agricultural production are now positively related to armed groups presence (with p<.1), and 
that the magnitude of the effect of asset index is reduced (but remains large). 
Overall, Table 2 reveals that the presence of armed groups is not random. Armed groups were more 
likely to target villages with higher levels of agricultural development (production and livestock 
ownership) and with higher levels of assets ownership. This suggests that the choice of location of 
armed groups may have been driven by an opportunistic motive (i.e. looting and extortion).  In contrast, 
there is also some evidence that villages with higher levels of human development (especially when 
measured by dietary diversity) have been less likely to experience armed groups presence. It is plausible 
that externally visible signs of economic development have attracted armed groups whereas less visible 
facets of economic development were protective. And there is a tendency for villages with higher 
                                                          
10 We do not include sub-division (cercle) specific effects as we are primarily interested in the global risk 
factors, not in the risk factors within each subdivision. Furthermore, as there were no armed groups in 
Bandiagara, including cercle fixed effects result in a severe loss of sample size. 
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proportion of Peulhs to more be likely to attract armed groups, although this effect is only statistically 
significant in 1 of 3 models. 
 
Table 2 Pre-Conflict Determinants of presence of armed groups in village between 2012-2017 
Pre-conflict variables Presence of armed groups in village between 2012 and 2017 
Estimator Logit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Primary school within 1km 0.79    0.14  
 (0.96)    (0.35)  
Secondary school within 5km 0.69    0.65  
 (0.62)    (1.10)  
Market within 5km 0.52    0.86  
 (0.56)    (1.57)  
Number of services  1.44    1.11  
 (0.45)    (0.80)  
Ethnic Fractionalization  1.02   0.96  
  (0.018)   (0.039)  
Proportion of Peulh  1.02   1.03 1.03* 
  (0.010)   (0.019) (0.016) 
Mean TLU   1.30**  1.44** 1.38** 
   (0.16)  (0.25) (0.21) 
Mean land size   0.80  0.77  
   (0.28)  (0.45)  
Mean agricultural production   1.00*  1.00 1.00* 
   (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Mean asset index    2.40 9.21* 6.03* 
    (1.36) (11.2) (5.95) 
Mean food consumption*    0.51 0.34  
    (0.34) (0.42)  
Mean dietary diversity score    0.43 0.21* 0.22** 
    (0.24) (0.19) (0.16) 
Observations 64 64 64 64 64 64 
*per adult equivalent 
 
3.2. Determinants of local conflict-related violence intensity 
 
We use the same strategy to estimate the determinants of intensity of local conflict-related violence, 
except that the dependent variable, 𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1, is now a count variable: 
 
 𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡  (2) 
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The dependent variable is the number of conflict-related fatalities within a 10-kilometer radius around 
each village. We used the negative binomial estimator to account for the fact that the number of fatalities 
is a count variable which displays very significant overdispersion (hence precluding the use of the 
Poisson estimator).  
In Table 3, we show the result of estimating equation (2) with the negative binomial estimator. The list 
of independent variables for each specification is the same as in Table 2 with the addition of the presence 
of armed groups. We decided to include the presence of armed groups as a covariate in equation (2) 
because armed groups primarily came in the 2012-14 period whereas conflict-related violence mostly 
took place during the 2015-17 period. The coefficient associated with armed group presence displays a 
positive sign but is never statistically significant. Its inclusion in the regressions does not change the 
results. Results are also largely unchanged if we only consider conflict-related violence on the period 
2015-17. 
We can see that no variables in the first 3 models exert a statistically significant effect on conflict 
intensity. Model (4) shows that mean levels of asset ownership are positively and very strongly 
associated with conflict intensity. Model (5) shows that ethnic fractionalization fosters conflict intensity 
but the effect is not very precisely estimated (p<0.1) and the model shows clear signs of overfitting with 
some coefficients being very large. Our preferred model is thus model (6) which confirms that ethnic 
fractionalization and asset ownerships are positively associated with conflict-intensity. In contrast, the 
number of services available in the village at baseline exert a protective effect against the conflict. Every 
additional service reduces the number of fatalities in a 10km radius around the village by 2. 
In summary, our results show that conflict intensity is unrelated to the presence of armed groups but is 
positively associated with average levels of asset ownership and by ethnic fractionalization, whereas 
presence of services in the village is associated with lower conflict intensity. The village characteristics 
associated with conflict intensity are therefore not too dissimilar from those of presence of armed 
groups. Specifically, ethnic diversity and assets ownership are predictors of both presence of armed 
groups and conflict intensity. In contrast, mean levels of household welfare and agricultural 
development are not associated with subsequent conflict intensity as were with presence of armed 
groups, and availability of services is associated with conflict intensity but not with the presence of 
armed groups. 
Results with number of events – as opposed to fatalities – and on the 2015-2017 sub-period yield 
qualitatively similar results. We also used a conditional negative binomial estimator to account for circle 
specific effects tend to reinforce, which gave very similar results. 
 
Table 3 Pre-Conflict Determinants of Intensity of Conflict-Related Violence in the immediate vicinity of villages 
Pre-conflict variables Number of conflict-related fatalities within 10km of village 
Estimator Negative Binomial Estimator 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Armed groups present  1.72 2.80 7.94 1.88 35.9  
 (2.96) (4.84) (45.4) (4.65) (139.2)  
Primary school within 1km .    .  
 (.)    (.)  
Secondary school within 5km 0.22    0.02  
 (0.44)    (0.08)  
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Market within 5km 3.76    90.85  
 (8.32)    (329.4)  
Number of services  0.49    0.27 0.13* 
 (0.41)    (0.40) (0.16) 
Ethnic Fractionalization  1.05   1.14* 1.11* 
  (0.05)   (0.09) (0.06) 
Proportion of Peulh  0.96   0.95  
  (0.04)   (0.05)  
Mean TLU   1.19  0.94  
   (0.42)  (0.47)  
Mean land size   1.47  0.18  
   (1.46)  (0.26)  
Mean agricultural production   1.00  1.00  
   (0.001)  (0.001)  
Mean asset index    18.35* 79.70 9.48** 
    (32.16) (240.1) (10.34) 
Mean food consumption*    0.11 0.21  
    (0.20) (0.38)  
Mean dietary diversity score    0.24 0.34  
    (0.30) (0.60)  
Observations 64 64 64 64 64 64 
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
4. Local Consequences of Conflict and Violence 
 
Armed conflict and violence exert an effect on households, markets, society and institutions that goes 
beyond the direct effect of killings and injuries. For instance, Degomme show that excess mortality due 
to armed conflict is primarily related to collapse of health systems and increase in malnutrition rather 
than to battles. Armed conflicts have the potential to cause disruption in the functioning of markets, 
strain communities, weaken governance – even at relatively low levels of intensity. Tranchant et al. 
(2014) show that households could not cope with droughts in conflict-affected contexts, causing 
devastating increase in malnutrition among children. Justino (2012) develops a systematic framework 
linking armed conflict and household welfare through a variety of channels (e.g. demographic change, 
coping mechanisms, institutional change, fear and trauma, social capital). 
In this section, we attempt to document some of these channels and assess whether they have been 
activated in the context of Mopti. Furthermore, we attempt to disentangle the effect of conflict that 
stems from the presence of armed groups from that resulting from the intensity (and proximity) of 
violence. Through the follow-up household survey completed in 2017, information was available on (i) 
insecurity and local violence, (ii) fear and restriction on the mobility of households, (iii) social capital, 
(iv) disruption of services, and (v) access to aid. As access to aid is a primary goal of the paper, we will 
look at it separately in section 5. 
To measure local insecurity and local conflict-related violence, we constructed indices of village-level 
insecurity and village-level conflict-related violence from household survey respondents’ answers. We 
asked respondents whether a number of acts of conflict and violence happened in their village in the 
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last 4 years, and the indices simply sum the number of acts that happened (the maximum for the violence 
index is 13). 11  Among the non-conflict violence, theft of livestock is by far the most common 
occurrence, as it is reported by 60% of respondents. We considered violence to be conflict-related in the 
case of banditry, terrorism/armed attacks, political violence, kidnapping, and violence/lynching due to 
armed group. The index of conflict-related violence in this case has a theoretical maximum of 5.  
To measure fear and restriction on peoples’ mobility, we asked respondents questions on whether they 
reduced their travels to a range of places because of fear. These included trips to the health center, to 
the market (for buying and for selling), to NGOs, to local administrations, to schools (for their children) 
etc.   
To measure social capital, we asked respondents whether people in their community could be trusted. 
We created a binary variable of trust that takes the value 1 when respondents answered that “people can 
be very trusted” and “people can be somewhat trusted” and 0 otherwise. We also asked how frequently 
people in the community discuss problems with each other how frequently people in the community 
help each other out. We crated binary variables discuss and help using the same approach and (“very 
frequently” and “somewhat frequently” were coded as 1). 
To measure service disruption, we asked community leaders whether services that were present at 
baseline ceased to function or were disrupted over the period 2012-2017. Most disruptions concerned 
schools (as the range of other services available at baseline was very limited) so we generated a binary 
variable taking the value 1 if at least one service was disrupted or stopped functioning between 2012 and 
2017. 
 
1.1. Bivariate analysis 
In Table 4, we present the results of bivariate association between these village-level variables and our 
two conflict descriptors (presence of armed groups, and local conflict-related intensity). We 
dichotomized the variable of fatalities for the sake of this analysis.   
We found that the mean of the village-level insecurity index was 2 in villages affected by armed groups 
against 1.1 in other villages and that the mean of the conflict-related violence index was 0.7 in villages 
directly affected by armed groups against 0.2 in villages unaffected. Both differences were highly 
statistically significant.12 In contrast, the differences in means were less marked and not statistically 
significant when we used fatalities to describe the conflict. 
The mean of the index of mobility restriction is very high as people on average report reducing their 
travels to almost 3 different places due to fear. This index reaches a mean of 4 in villages in the vicinity 
of whose fatalities were present and of 5 where armed groups were present. In both cases, the differences 
                                                          
11 We also calculated indices based on the reported frequency of these acts, which gave the same results. 
12 Among the non-conflict violence, theft of livestock is by far the most common occurrence, as it is reported by 
60% of respondents. This proportion is markedly higher in villages affected by armed groups (73%) than in 
villages unaffected (56%). We find the same pattern when we look at frequency of theft. Whereas 92% of 
respondents in villages where armed groups were present report that theft of livestock was occasional or frequent, 
the proportion falls to 62% in villages where armed groups were absent. 
 
17 
in means are statistically significant (but especially so when conflict is measured by presence of armed 
groups).   
We find high levels of social capital. 92% of respondents trust people in their community, 90% of 
respondents consider that people discuss problems with each other, and 85% of respondents consider 
that people help each other out. Both the average levels of trust and of help are significantly lower in 
conflict-affected villages. This is true – in roughly the same proportion - when we operationalize conflict 
with presence of armed groups or with the presence of fatalities. 
 
Table 4 Bivariate associations between presence of armed groups and conflict-related violence; and village-level indicators 
  Armed groups 
were present in 
village between 
2012 and 2017 
 Conflict-related 
Fatalities within 
10km of village 
between 2012 and 
2017 
 
  Yes No  Yes No  
 Sample 
Mean 
Mean Mean Difference 
(p-value) 
Mean Mean Difference 
 (p-value) 
Village 
Insecurity 
index 
1.22 1.99 1.07 0.92*** 
(0.00) 
1.61 1.19 0.41 
(0.15) 
Village conflict-
related violence 
index 
0.30 0.73 0.22 0.51*** 
(0.00) 
0.28 0.32 -0.04 
(0.78) 
Mobility 
restriction 
index 
2.98 4.96 2.66 2.3*** 
(0.00) 
4.18 2.79 1.39* 
(0.06) 
Trust 0.92 0.83 0.93 -0.10** 
(0.02) 
0.80 0.93 -0.13*** 
(0.002) 
Discuss 0.91 0.88 0.91 -0.03 
(0.30) 
0.87 0.91 -0.05 
(0.17) 
Help 0.85 0.79 0.87 -0.08* 
(0.06) 
0.79 0.86 -0.07* 
(0.1) 
Service 
disruption 
0.30 0.50 0.26 0.24 
(0.13) 
0.67 0.23 0.44*** 
(0.01) 
N 66 10 56  9 57  
Note: authors’ calculations. 
 
1.2. Multivariate analysis 
Unfortunately, we do not have baseline values for these variables so we cannot document how they 
evolved following the conflict. Thus, this analysis is purely correlational. Indeed, we cannot rule out 
that e.g. the lower trust observed in conflict-affected villages was already present prior to the conflict 
and is a cause rather than a consequence of the conflict.  
We can, however, refine the analysis by conducting multivariate regressions that include the baseline 
values of the key village characteristics we used in section 3. In so doing, we can assess whether the 
strong relationships of Table 4 resist when predictors of conflict are accounted for.  
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Table 5 reports OLS estimations of village-level potential consequences of conflict on presence of 
armed groups and number of fatalities. The first specification for each dependent variable only includes 
these two covariates and the second specification adds the covariates of equation (1), i.e. service 
provision, ethnic composition, agricultural development and household welfare. We can see that 
introducing presence of armed groups and number of fatalities together does not change much the 
insights from the bivariate analysis. The presence of armed groups is associated with more insecurity, 
more village-level violence, and reduced social capital. The number of fatalities is weakly associated 
with service disruption and reduced trust. When we include the full range of controls, we see that the 
association between the presence of armed groups and insecurity decreases in magnitude and cease to 
be statistically significant. The association between presence of armed groups and local conflict-related 
violence also decrease in magnitude but remains statistically significant. In contrast, the relationships 
between presence of armed groups and reduced trust and between fatalities and service disruption are 
unaffected. These results suggest that the correlation between presence of armed groups and local 
insecurity was largely spurious in that the processes leading to the presence of armed groups and the 
processes leading to local insecurity are the same. Indeed, the most significant predictors of local 
violence are the proportion of Peulhs and the value of agricultural production. When we control for 
these factors, the relationship between presence of armed groups and insecurity disappears. However, 
the fact that the other correlations remain statistically significant even after controlling for the 
determinants of conflict suggest that local violence, reduced trust and service disruption are plausible 
pathways through which the armed conflict in Mopti adversely affect peoples.  
In Table 6, we replicate the same analysis, but we now introduce cercle dummies to account for cercle 
specific fixed effects. The results are fairly similar to those of Table 5 except that fatalities are now 
significantly associated with lower social capital.  
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Table 5 Presence of armed groups, conflict-related intensity and village-level consequences. OLS estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Village 
Violence 
intensity 
index 
Village 
Violence 
intensity 
index 
Village 
Conflict-
Violence 
intensity 
index 
Village 
Conflict-
Violence 
intensity 
index 
Trust Trust Discuss Discuss Help Help Service 
disruption 
Service 
disruption 
Armed groups present  0.90*** 0.23 0.51*** 0.20* -0.096** -0.11** -0.029 -0.018 -0.077* -0.085* 0.96 1.41 
 (0.25) (0.24) (0.12) (0.12) (0.041) (0.043) (0.032) (0.040) (0.043) (0.048) (0.74) (1.05) 
Fatalities within 10k 0.010 0.012 -0.0021 0.00081 -0.0037 -0.0024 -0.0027 -0.0033 -0.0021 -0.0038 0.10* 0.12* 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.0080) (0.0072) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.058) (0.069) 
Primary school < 1km  0.18  -0.018  -0.11**  -0.053  -0.030  -0.89 
  (0.28)  (0.14)  (0.051)  (0.048)  (0.057)  (1.42) 
Secondary school 
<5km 
 0.032  -0.027  0.038  0.022  0.00  0.59 
  (0.21)  (0.10)  (0.037)  (0.035)  (0.042)  (0.93) 
Market within 5km  -0.039  0.023  -0.0049  -0.056  -0.0088  -0.31 
  (0.20)  (0.10)  (0.037)  (0.034)  (0.041)  (0.89) 
Number of services   -0.020  0.038  0.0088  0.013  0.015  0.34 
  (0.082)  (0.041)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.39) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
 0.26  -0.37  -0.040  -0.012  -0.045  4.48* 
  (0.58)  (0.29)  (0.11)  (0.098)  (0.12)  (2.62) 
Proportion of Peulh  0.016***  0.0082***  -0.00  -0.00043  -0.001  0.0045 
  (0.0034)  (0.0017)  (0.001)  (0.00057)  (0.001)  (0.015) 
Mean TLU  0.019  0.010  -0.00  0.0020  0.0086  -0.21 
  (0.028)  (0.014)  (0.005)  (0.0047)  (0.0056)  (0.15) 
Mean land size  -0.10  -0.056  0.0012  0.0096  0.012  -0.100 
  (0.069)  (0.034)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.34) 
Mean ag. production  0.24***  0.056  -0.023  -0.022  -0.047***  -0.26 
  (0.084)  (0.042)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.41) 
Mean asset index  0.48***  0.20***  0.0069  -0.0071  0.0028  0.41 
  (0.11)  (0.057)  (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.023)  (0.59) 
Mean food Cons.*  -0.095  -0.041  0.0081  0.00065  -0.016  0.45 
  (0.083)  (0.042)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.37) 
Mean dietary diversity   -0.15  -0.15***  -0.069***  0.0090  -0.032  0.035 
  (0.10)  (0.051)  (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.021)  (0.48) 
Observations 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 
R2 0.19 0.60 0.23 0.59 0.12 0.45 0.043 0.18 0.065 0.34   
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6 Presence of armed groups, conflict-related intensity and village-level consequences. Cercle fixed effects estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Village 
Violence 
intensity 
index 
Village 
Violence 
intensity 
index 
Village 
Conflict-
Violence 
intensity 
index 
Village 
Conflict-
Violence 
intensity 
index 
Trust Trust Discus
s 
Discuss Help Help Service 
disruption 
Service 
disruption 
Armed groups present  0.59** 0.083 0.40*** 0.16 -0.079** -0.088** -0.015 -0.0063 -0.071* -0.075 -0.022 0.66 
 (0.26) (0.24) (0.12) (0.12) (0.034) (0.039) (0.036) (0.042) (0.042) (0.048) (0.80) (1.15) 
Fatalities within 10k -0.00 0.004 -0.01 -0.005 -0.005** -0.0042* -0.002 -0.0028 -0.004 -0.006* 0.072 0.059 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.007) (0.002) (0.0024) (0.002) (0.0026) (0.003) (0.003) (0.056) (0.071) 
Primary school < 1km  0.020  -0.054  -0.074  -0.038  -0.011  -1.75 
  (0.28)  (0.14)  (0.046)  (0.050)  (0.058)  (1.54) 
Secondary school 
<5km 
 0.044  -0.025  0.032  0.021  -0.0031  0.45 
  (0.20)  (0.10)  (0.033)  (0.036)  (0.041)  (1.01) 
Market within 5km  0.043  0.048  -0.018  -0.063*  -0.014  -0.30 
  (0.20)  (0.099)  (0.032)  (0.035)  (0.040)  (1.08) 
Number of services   0.071  0.076  -0.0032  0.0052  0.013  0.59 
  (0.095)  (0.047)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.61) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
 0.48  -0.24  -0.044  -0.029  -0.032  4.47 
  (0.58)  (0.29)  (0.095)  (0.10)  (0.12)  (3.07) 
Proportion of Peulh  0.015***  0.0076***  -0.00  -0.00  -0.0012*  -0.005 
  (0.0033)  (0.0017)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.02) 
Mean TLU  0.015  0.0056  -0.0021  0.0022  0.0070  -0.24 
  (0.027)  (0.014)  (0.0044)  (0.0048)  (0.0055)  (0.16) 
Mean land size  -0.072  -0.046  -0.0049  0.0069  0.0100  -0.018 
  (0.068)  (0.034)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.40) 
Mean ag. production  0.22**  0.076*  0.00038  -0.019  -0.030*  -0.14 
  (0.088)  (0.044)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.46) 
Mean asset index  0.44***  0.20***  0.024  -0.0032  0.013  0.25 
  (0.11)  (0.057)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.023)  (0.58) 
Mean food Cons.*  -0.12  -0.050  0.013  0.0029  -0.015  0.48 
  (0.082)  (0.041)  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.48) 
Mean dietary diversity   -0.16  -0.12**  -0.039**  0.011  -0.010  0.26 
   (0.11)  (0.054)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.022)  (0.56) 
Observations 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 62 62 
R2 0.082 0.53 0.18 0.52 0.16 0.34 0.019 0.17 0.077 0.25   
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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5. Conflict and access to aid in Mopti 
 
5.1. Previous evidence 
Maiden and Brockway (2018) analyze of the targeting of aid during conflict using village and household 
level survey data from Mali. They find that agricultural aid distributed by NGOs in conflict prone areas 
of northern Mali is not reaching those most in need. In contrast, aid is more likely to go to villages with 
a more politically or socially connected village leaders, irrespective of need. Political connection is 
defined by the ability and willingness of local officials to speak French during the survey. According to 
the authors, village leaders who prefer to communicate in French with international donors in northern 
Mali are more educated, wealthy, least likely to have attended a religious school, and are likely more 
closely aligned with the central government rather than with the jihadist groups. 
 In villages where officials speak French, the most vulnerable households are not guaranteed to receive 
agricultural aid while in other villages aid goes to households who are most in need (as measured by 
vulnerability to exogenous shocks). Controlling for the language of village leader shows that urban 
villages, villages farther from municipal centers, those that lack reliable transportation to the capital, 
and villages with large water stores are less likely to receive agricultural aid. 
At the household level, environmental shocks appear to increase the likelihood of receiving agricultural 
aid. Vulnerability to economic shocks reduces the probability of receiving agricultural aid and the 
proximity to conflict appears to have a negative effect on aid reception in most specifications.  
Tranchant et al. 2017 using the same household dataset as in the current paper estimate the likelihood 
for households to receive any food aid, General Food Distribution (GFD) and school feeding. They find 
that household-level variables have very little predictive power on the likelihood of receiving aid. 
Receipt of school feeding is more likely in villages with lower mean levels of socioeconomic status and 
the presence of armed groups tends to reduce likelihood to receive aid. 
 
5.2. Aid coverage and conflict in Mopti 
Table 7 provides information on the aid coverage over the period 2015-17 among households in our 
Mopti sample. Almost half of households received any type of aid between 2015 and 2017. This 
proportion ranges from 0% in 2 villages to 96% in 1 village. The most common form of aid is general 
food distribution (GFD), which was received by 22% of respondents. GFD was present in 56 of the 66 
villages of the sample, and the maximum coverage in a given village was near universal (91% of 
respondents). The second most common form of aid was school feeding (SF), which was received by 
14% of households. School feeding was present in fewer villages (42), and the maximum coverage did 
not exceed 59% of respondents in a given village.  
Apart from food aid, 9% of households reported receiving veterinary services. Such services were 
delivered in over half the villages of the sample (35 out of 66) and maximum coverage did not exceed 
38% of respondents. Provision of health services (writ large) was reported by 7% of respondents and 
covered 24 villages. Unsurprisingly, the within-village coverage of health services was high, with a 
maximum coverage rate of 76% of households. Finally, 7% of households reported receiving 
agricultural services. Such services were available in 26 villages and they reached 60% of households 
at the most in a given village.    
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Table 7 Household-level coverage of aid between 2015 and 2017 
 Mean SD Min Max Number of villages with 
coverage (out of 66) 
Received any aid (% of 
households) 
0.47 0.22 0 0.96 64 
Total types of aid received 0.7 0.45 0 2.4  
Received GFD (% of 
households) 
0.22 0.22 0 0.91 56 
SF (% of households) 0.14 0.15 0 0.59 42 
Veterinary services (% of 
households) 
0.09 0.11 0 0.38 35 
Health (% of households) 0.07 0.15 0 0.76 24 
Agriculture (% of 
households) 
0.07 0.13 0 0.60 26 
 
We now turn to the estimations of the determinants of aid intensity at village level. We use the same 
pre-conflict covariates as for the previous analysis, to which we add the variables of armed groups 
presence and fatalities within 10km around a village, that are measured over the whole period. In so 
doing, we wish to uncover the deep-rooted characteristics associated with aid allocation as well as to 
ascertain the effect of the armed conflict (through control of armed groups and/or conflict-related 
violence) on aid. 
 The equation we estimate is as follows: 
 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎
�����
𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1+ 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐 + 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 (3) 
 
Where 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎�����𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1 is the proportion of households in village j that receive aid k in period t+1. The 
covariates are the same than in equation (1) except for 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1, which represents the presence of armed 
groups in the village between 2012 and 2017 and 𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡+1, which is a measure of conflict intensity in a 
radius of 10km around the village. Finally, 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐 denotes cercle-specific effects. We estimate equation (3) 
by OLS both without and with cercle dummies. The results are in Table 8 and in Table 9. 
The results show that the conflict exerts a strong and complex impact on aid intensity at village-level. 
The presence of armed groups tends to reduce aid intensity whereas conflict-related fatalities tend to 
increase aid intensity. Specifically, the presence of armed groups is associated with a 11 percentage point 
reduction in the proportion of households receiving school feeding, a 8 percentage point reduction in 
the proportion of households receiving veterinary services and a reduction by half of the types of aid 
received (the coefficient is 0.4 and the total types of aid received in the sample is 0.7). Both the effects 
on types of aid and on veterinary services are robust and strongly significant from a statistical point of 
view. The effect on school feeding is less precisely estimated and is only distinguishable from 0 at the 
10% level with the cercle fixed effects. 
The number of conflict-related fatalities in a radius of 10km around the village is positively associated 
with the likelihood of receiving any aid, with the number of aid types received, and with the likelihood 
of receiving GFD and health services.  
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6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
We have exploited a unique panel dataset whose first wave was collected just prior to the onset of the 
armed conflict in Mali to gain some insights on the local characteristics associated with the conflict, on 
the likely mechanisms through which conflict impacts communities, and on the role conflict plays on 
aid allocation.  
On the first point, we found that villages with higher levels of agricultural production, livestock 
ownership and assets ownership are more likely to experience the presence of armed groups. These 
effects are large and suggest that armed groups are opportunistic in how they target villages. Villages 
with more agricultural production and assets ownership allow armed groups to extract more resources. 
This echoes previous findings showing that land-rich households are more likely to be targeted by 
conflict (see e.g. Justino and Verwimp 2013). In contrast, higher levels of food consumption are 
negatively related to the presence of armed groups. While at first, this may seem contradictory with the 
previous result, it does not have to be once we recognize that socioeconomic development may exert a 
complex effect on conflict risks. Subnational research has shown that conflicts tend to happen in less 
developed places within a given country (see Buhaug and Rod 2006) and there is a very strong 
relationship at the country-level between indicators of economic of development and lower risks of 
conflict (see Collier and Hoefller 2004). This is typically explained by the fact that higher development 
levels mean higher opportunity costs of joining a rebellion, lower grievances against the state and higher 
state capacity. While visible signs of wealth may attract rebels wishing to extract resources, higher 
levels of invisible household welfare plays in the opposite direction, as it means villages have more 
capacity to resist the rebels and/or offer less chance of finding local support. 
On the second point, we found that conflict is correlated with a range of long-term drivers of 
development. These include lack of crime and insecurity, physical mobility, social capital, service 
provision and access to aid. We know that conflicts exert a long-term impact on human capital and 
household welfare through their direct effect on household composition but also through their indirect 
effects going through the factors quoted above. In this paper, we have shown that the presence of armed 
groups is significantly related to more insecurity, lower trust and that conflict intensity is significantly 
related to lower social capital and service disruption. 
On the third point, we found that the presence of armed groups strongly reduces aid coverage, even 
after controlling for pre-conflict village characteristics and cercle fixed effects. On the contrary, there 
is a positive association between the intensity of the conflict-related violence around a village and aid 
coverage in that same village.  
Taken together, the paper has three main policy implications. First, armed conflicts are complex 
phenomena and reducing conflicts to their level of violence intensity – as is often the case in the 
literature – blinds us to some important facets of conflict. It is especially important to look at both 
presence of armed groups and violence intensity as these proved unrelated to each other, and to exert 
differentiated impacts on people’ lives. Second, the presence of armed groups tends to matter the most, 
at least in the Mopti context. It is not possible to assess whether it is the presence of the groups 
themselves or rather the absence of the state that is associated with more crime, less trust, and less aid, 
but in any case looking at violence is not telling the whole story. Third, humanitarian and development 
actors need to pay attention to issues of control by armed groups over and beyond conflict intensity. 
Our analysis in Mopti shows that aid practitioners do target areas with more violence, but that they also 
disengage from areas with armed groups presence.  
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Finally, it is important to note that the study has a number of limitations. The two most important ones 
are the sample size and the endogeneity issue. We rely on a sample of 66 villages, out of which about 
10 only are conflict-affected (regardless of how we define this). And while we can control for pre-crisis 
characteristics, and account for cercle fixed effects, it remains true that neither conflict nor aid are 
randomly determined.  
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Table 8 Determinants of aid coverage at village-level between 2015 and 2017 
 % 
households 
receiving any 
aid 
% 
households 
receiving any 
aid 
Number of 
types of aid 
received by 
households 
Number of 
types of aid 
received by 
households 
% 
households 
receiving 
GFD 
% 
households 
receiving 
GFD 
% 
households 
receiving 
school 
feeding 
% 
households 
receiving 
school 
feeding 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Armed groups present -0.12 -0.13 -0.35** -0.43*** -0.094 -0.098 -0.11* -0.11 
 (0.084) (0.087) (0.15) (0.15) (0.080) (0.062) (0.061) (0.065) 
Fatalities within 10k 0.016*** 0.012** 0.051*** 0.044*** 0.020*** 0.013*** 0.0057 0.0055 
 (0.0051) (0.0054) (0.0094) (0.0095) (0.0048) (0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0041) 
Primary school within 1km 0.061 0.051 0.036 -0.057 0.068 0.10 0.089 0.091 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.18) (0.18) (0.095) (0.074) (0.073) (0.078) 
Secondary school <5km 0.057 0.060 0.054 0.066 0.12* 0.099* 0.0094 0.0074 
 (0.073) (0.074) (0.13) (0.13) (0.069) (0.053) (0.053) (0.055) 
Market within 5km -0.057 -0.047 -0.15 -0.099 -0.037 -0.037 -0.071 -0.072 
 (0.072) (0.073) (0.13) (0.13) (0.068) (0.052) (0.052) (0.055) 
Number of services  0.0054 0.028 0.0062 0.080 -0.0035 -0.015 0.017 0.013 
 (0.029) (0.035) (0.054) (0.061) (0.028) (0.025) (0.021) (0.026) 
Ethnic Fractionalisation 0.058 0.14 0.30 0.51 0.027 0.045 0.25 0.24 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.38) (0.37) (0.19) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) 
Proportion of Peulh 0.002* 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.00 0.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Mean TLU -0.001 -0.004 -0.011 -0.016 0.01 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.018) (0.017) (0.01) (0.007) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mean land size 0.013 0.019 -0.011 0.012 0.01 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.045) (0.044) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Mean ag. production -0.003 0.012 0.041 0.047 -0.04 0.012 0.01 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.032) (0.055) (0.056) (0.03) (0.023) (0.022) (0.02) 
Mean asset index 0.028 0.031 0.070 0.052 0.002 0.032 -0.005 -0.003 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.075) (0.073) (0.04) (0.030) (0.03) (0.03) 
Mean food consumption* -0.034 -0.040 -0.066 -0.086 -0.021 -0.014 0.005 0.01 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.055) (0.053) (0.028) (0.021) (0.02) (0.02) 
Mean dietary diversity  0.042 0.062 0.039 0.056 -0.063* 0.0096 0.002 0.005 
 (0.037) (0.040) (0.067) (0.070) (0.035) (0.029) (0.03) (0.03) 
Cercle FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 
R2 0.35 0.37 0.50 0.53 0.47 0.40 0.26 0.22 
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Table 9 Determinants of aid coverage at village-level between 2015 and 2017 
 % 
households 
receiving 
health 
services 
% 
households 
receiving 
health 
services 
% 
households 
receiving 
veterinary 
services 
% 
households 
receiving 
veterinary 
services 
% 
households 
receiving 
agricultura
l services 
% 
households 
receiving 
agricultura
l services 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Armed groups present  -0.034 -0.063 -0.089** -0.079** -0.042 -0.06 
 (0.051) (0.049) (0.038) (0.038) (0.048) (0.05) 
Fatalities within 10k 0.010*** 0.011*** -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Primary school <1km 0.063 0.020 0.042 0.046 -0.19*** -0.21*** 
 (0.061) (0.058) (0.045) (0.046) (0.057) (0.057) 
Secondary school <5km -0.056 -0.048 -0.016 -0.0078 -0.065 -0.057 
 (0.045) (0.041) (0.033) (0.032) (0.042) (0.041) 
Market within 5km -0.039 -0.022 0.032 0.028 0.011 0.022 
 (0.044) (0.041) (0.032) (0.032) (0.041) (0.040) 
Number of services  -0.012 0.010 -0.025* -0.015 0.030* 0.054*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) 
Ethnic Fractionalisation -0.089 -0.048 0.022 0.053 -0.074 -0.013 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.092) (0.094) (0.12) (0.12) 
Proportion of Peulh 0.001* 0.002** 0.001 0.001* -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Mean TLU -0.0024 -0.001 0.006 0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.0060) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mean land size -0.014 -0.005 0.019* 0.022* -0.016 -0.008 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) 
Mean ag. production 0.055*** 0.037** 0.0071 0.0041 0.004 -0.001 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) 
Mean asset index 0.048* 0.031 0.012 0.0085 0.008 -0.001 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) 
Mean food consumption* -0.017 -0.025 -0.017 -0.021 -0.025 -0.032* 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) 
Mean dietary diversity  0.012 -0.011 0.054*** 0.046** 0.039* 0.032 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.016) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) 
Cercle FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 64 64 64 64 64 64 
R2 0.45 0.39 0.49 0.45 0.38 0.42 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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